Reliabilism is a philosophical theory of knowledge that has traditionally focused on propositional knowledge. Paul Churchland has advocated for a reconceptualization of reliabilism to "liberate it" from propositional attitudes (such as accepting that p, believing that p, knowing that p, and the like). In the process, he (a) outlines an alternative for the notion of truth (which he calls "representational success"), (b) offers a non-standard account of theory, and (c) invokes the preceding ideas to provide an account of representation and knowledge that emphasizes our skill or capacity for navigating the world. Crucially, he defines reliabilism (and knowledge) in terms of representational success. This paper discusses these ideas and raises some concerns. Since Churchland takes a neurocomputational approach, we discuss our training of neural networks to classify images of faces. We use this work to suggest that the kind of reliability at work in some knowledge claims is not usefully understood in terms of the aforementioned notion of representational success.
INTRODUCTION
Claims to propositional knowledge have the form, S knows that p, where p is a proposition. Reliabilism is a philosophical approach to the theory of propositional knowledge. Among the necessary conditions for some agent or subject S knowing proposition p are that (a) p is true, (b) S believes p, and (c) p is the outcome of a reliable process or method. According to Alvin Goldman (1986 , 1992 , 1999 , 2002 reliability is required for both epistemic justification and knowledge. As we will concern ourselves primarily with the reliability requirement in this paper, we shall not engage the issue of what might constitute sufficient conditions for either knowledge or justification.
The reliability of a process or method is understood in terms of a ratio: it is the number of true beliefs produced by a process or method divided by the total number of beliefs produced by a process or method. A process that produces 100 beliefs, only 80 of which are true, is 80 percent reliable. We need not concern ourselves here over exactly what the standard of reliability needs to be either for epistemic justification or for knowledge. What does need to be noticed is that reliability, traditionally understood, requires us to look at propositional attitudes (either a belief that p, or acceptance that p, or something along these lines) and truth.
It is not uncommon for philosophers to distinguish between propositional knowledge on the one hand and capacity knowledge or skill knowledge on the other. Skill knowledge takes the form S knows how to x, where x is some sort of behaviour or action. While it is often contested whether it is appropriate to say that pre-linguistic children or animals have propositional knowledge, it is generally conceded that they have various sorts of capacity or skill knowledge. A dog may know how to stay afloat and swim in water without any propositional knowledge of the physics of these matters. Paul Churchland's "What Happens to Reliabilism When It Is Liberated from the Propositional Attitudes?" (chapter six of Neurophilosophy at Work) is a thought provoking attempt to take a reliabilist approach to epistemology, divorce it from propositional attitudes, and explain how we can have nonpropositional knowledge. Churchland begins by enumerating many instances of know-how. The examples include the knowledge possessed both by humans and non-humans. He argues that much of what we call knowledge has little or nothing to do with the fixing of propositional attitudes. There are many useful and important insights here. He also goes on to argue that a reliabilist epistemology can be developed that requires neither propositional attitudes (belief or acceptance) nor truth. This is a striking claim. After all, the reliabilist understands knowledge in terms of reliably arrived at true beliefs. Clearly, this way of doing things requires talking about both propositional attitudes and truth. Churchland tries to formulate a reliabilism where neither truth nor propositional attitudes are required. In the process, he develops a notion of representational success and defines reliability in terms of it. We will argue that at least in some cases of attributing skill knowledge or know-how, the notion of representational success is simply not needed. At best, representational success might play a role in explaining the source of reliability, but even that will be shown to be less attractive than it first appears.
RELIABILITY AND REPRESENTATIONAL SUCCESS
Churchland recognizes the importance of truth in classical approaches to reliabilism, but he resists talking of truth since (a) it attaches to propositional attitudes, and (b) much of our knowledge is not about fixing propositional attitudes. On classical accounts of reliabilism, the reliability required for knowledge is a function of true beliefs. Churchland's representational success, loosely modeled after the representational success of maps, is his replacement for truth. Churchland (2007, p. 111 ) understands conceptual spaces as similarity spaces, and the reliability requirement for knowledge amounts to the claim that a conceptual framework or similarity space be "produced by a mechanism of vector-fixation that is generally reliable in producing activation vectors that are [representationally] successful in the sense just outlined."
We just tended to the issue of how Churchland formulates reliabilism without reference to truth. Before going further, we need to review how he conceives of theories. Churchland treats the information stored in the synaptic weights of a network as the network's theory. His criterion for theory identity has to do with the distance relations that hold between points in hidden unit activation vector state space. He wants to allow for the possibility that different sets of synaptic weights may implement the same theory. Given two sets of synaptic weights, S1 and S2, they can be said to implement the same theory if they lead to a partitioning of hidden unit activation vector state space such that the distance relations between points, in the respective state space they generate, are preserved. In this way, we can understand what it means for a theory to change or stay the same in one network, and what it means for two different networks to implement the same or different theories.
What if we had a non-propositional task performed by a network where (a) we could measure reliability and (b) that reliability was not understood in terms of the aforementioned notion of representational success? This would be a problem for the type of position Churchland has developed. In the next section we describe some neural networks so that in the fourth section, we can discuss scenarios where representational success is not needed to discuss reliability.
SEX CLASSIFICATION NETWORK
In this section, we will describe artificial neural networks (ANNs) that we have trained to classify images of faces as either male or female. All of the networks created were three-layer, fully interconnected feed-forward networks trained by supervised learning using the generalized delta rule. To conduct our experiments, images were first converted into vectors that were capable of being analyzed by the ANN. The converted vectors consisted of 5824 dimensions, one for each pixel of the image, where each image was 64 x 91 pixels. Each unit (i.e., each pixel) varied from 0 to 255, which corresponds to the 256 shades of grey in the images. All networks discussed contained 1 output unit, 60 hidden units, and 5824 input units. We experimented using both sigmoid and radial basis activation functions. Although the results were comparable, we opted to carry out most of our trials using sigmoid activation functions. The results in this paper reflect this preference.
Initially there were 101 images. However, due to image/file corruption, a number of the images were either corrupted outright or corrupted during the vector conversion process. A total of 89 images were used for training and testing purposes.
For training purposes, the desired output for all female images was set to 0; the desired output for all male images was set to 1. For testing, any output result over 0.5 was interpreted as a male classification, and any result below 0.5 was interpreted as a female classification.
The training and testing runs we will discuss herein are of two types. First, we trained on partial sets. We randomly selected 44 images, used them for training, and then we tested on the remaining 45. We also trained on the 45 image set, and tested on the remaining 44. Second, we trained the network on the entire 89 image corpus.
A DISCUSSION OF CHURCHLAND'S POSITION
The first point we want to make is that, given the way Churchland defines theories and representational success, it is possible for two different theories to have equal levels of representational success. Consider, for example, networks N1 and N2. N1 was trained on 44 images and tested on 45; N2 was trained on 45 images and tested on 44. Each had its weights randomly selected; each was trained using the same parameter values, and each achieved essentially the same level of success in classifying outputs of previously unseen images (approximately 89%), but there are important differences in the cluster plots. These plots pair each face with its closest neighbour in state space; then averages for each pair are computed, and each average is paired with its closest neighbour, and so on. Figure 1 is the cluster plot for N1, and Figure 2 is the cluster plot for N2. While there is some overlap between the plots, there are important differences as well. An examination of the lower portions of the cluster plots immediately reveals some significant differences. We have two networks with equal levels of classificatory success, but each implements a different theory. This does not change if we train the network on the entire set of images. If we randomly select weights for networks N3 and N4, and train each on the entire training corpus with perfect classificatory success, we can still generate different cluster plots (or theories) for the networks. Assuming this means that we can say that N1 and N2 have equal levels of representational success, and N3 and N4 have equal levels of representational success, then there is a difference between classical truth as correspondence and Churchland's substitute, representational success. On classical conceptions of theories and truth, two inconsistent theories cannot both be true. However, it may well be that two conflicting theories (in Churchland's sense of "theory") can both be equally representationally successful. There may well be different ways of measuring similarities and differences between faces, and different networks may hone in on different features or relations, or perhaps on the same features and relations but weigh them differently, leading to different similarity spaces (or different theories) that achieve equally good or even perfect performance. We offer this as a point of clarification since it might be something Churchland (2007, p. 132-134 ) is happy to concede.
The second point we want to make is that representational success and reliability appear to come apart. Remember, Churchland defines reliability in terms of representational success. With networks N1 and N2, we achieved 89% classificatory success on new cases, and with N3 and N4, we achieved 100% classificatory success on the total set of images. Notice, we said "success," not "reliability." To talk of reliability in Churchland's sense, we would have to be assured that the distance relations in the state spaces map on to distance relations in the world, since reliability is defined in terms of representational success. However, it seems perfectly natural in cases like these to talk about the reliability of the network even if we have no prior views on the level of representational success achieved. To see this, let us consider two scenarios. First, consider two hypothetical networks, N5 and N6, and let us say that training leads to poor classificatory performance. Second, consider hypothetical networks N7 and N8, and let us say that training leads to outstanding classificatory performance. Our intuition is that it is quite reasonable to say that N5 and N6 have poor reliability and that N7 and N8 have high levels of reliability before we learn anything about the structure of the hidden unit activation vector state spaces of any of these networks. Before doing any sort of detailed analysis, we simply do not know exactly which distance relations in faces the networks are honing in on during training, and for purposes of discussing reliability, it just does not seem to matter. But Churchland's definition of reliability in situations like this is about the level of success with respect to distance relations in state space mapping on to distance relations in the faces (i.e., real-world features). If an objector were to insist that this is not a problem since, in spite of our not being aware of it, networks having high levels of classificatory success are constructing similarity spaces that map on to the world, and those without classificatory success are not producing such spaces, then it is not clear how much explanatory work the notion of representational success is doing for the notion of reliability. In arguing against a pragmatist notion of truth, Churchland (2007, p. 103) claims that he would not want to explain truth in terms of successful behaviour, and representational success is his substitute for truth. We are suggesting that the only evidence we have for success in the networks we have been considering is successful classificatory behaviour. (We are not arguing for a pragmatist theory of truth. Rather, we are suggesting that when it comes to explaining know-how or attributions of know-how, a system's or individual's behaviour is very much of the essence.) Whatever the structure of state spaces generated by N5 and N6 (whether they are the same or different) we will say that they are unreliable. Whatever the structure of the state spaces generated by N7 and N8 (whether the same or different) we will say that they are reliable. And we will make our claims based on behaviour. What we are interested in when discussing a network's (or an individual's) reliability in classifying faces is the ability to successfully perform. One further piece of evidence for this is that when we make attributions of know-how, we are not much interested in how that know-how is achieved. For example, if we say that two year old Jasmine knows how to recognize boys and girls by looking at their faces, we are saying that Jasmine can perform this task very well, and that we can rely on her to do so. Robert Brandom (2000, chapter 3) discusses the importance of the intersubjective nature of knowledge attribution (though his focus is on propositional knowledge, whereas ours is on capacity or skill knowledge). We can say all of this without ever knowing the structure of her face state space and the ways in which its distance relations do or do not map on to the world.
The above arguments assume that equal levels of classificatory performance mean equal levels of representational success. Some might challenge this assumption, but we do not think that doing so leads to a plausible defence of Churchland's position. Consider: if two networks can achieve perfect classificatory success, and that is still not enough to say that they are equally representationally successful, then the notion of representational success seems puzzlingly irrelevant to defining reliability since in such cases, surely we would like to say that the networks in question are equally reliable; that is, that they know equally well how to classify faces as male and female.
It might be thought that a neurocomputational reliabilist would remain content with saying that representational success explains successful behaviour, and if there is more than one way to be representationally successful, then it will turn out that there is more than one way to explain how the successful behaviour was arrived at. Perhaps, in the end, such a response may be made to work, but much work would have to be done. There are many logically possible metrics. See Laakos and Cottrell (2006) for an extended discussion of the importance of metrics. Churchland appears to assume that the distances between points in state space are Euclidean distances. Mahalanobis distance, city block or taxi cab distance, and other metrics are available. For the sake of argument, say that by using a Euclidean metric, a given set of faces is very similar in the state space for network N9, and by using a Mahalanobis metric, they are not similar. Is N9 representationally successful or not? Is N9 reliable or not? We suspect that you probably want to know how N9 performs in terms of classifying faces before you answer these questions. When Churchland remarks that street maps are representationally successful in virtue of preserving distance relations in the world, it must be understood that there is a preferred metric for distance at work. We have been considering a case (faces in state space) where it is not obvious that there is a preferred metric. Without a preferred metric, it is not clear what talk of preserving similarity relations amounts to (since such talk is a function of some metric). In the absence of a preferred metric for similarity relations, performance becomes the driving consideration since it is not even clear what representational success (in Churchland's sense) amounts to if we do not have a preferred metric. However, we can still have capacity knowledge in such cases (for example, the male-female discrimination task).
Of Maps and State Spaces
Finally, let us close with some reflections on the map metaphor, which appears to inspire many of Churchland's thoughts on these matters. The idea is that a street map is representationally successful because it preserves distance relations that are in the world. Part of what makes this metaphor attractive is that such a map would cease to be a reliable guide if it did not at least roughly track distance relations in the world. Imagine that the map says your desired exit is 10km away and, in fact, it is only 0.1km away -that is an exit you will likely miss. In a case like this, tracking a specific set of distance/similarity relations in the world is the key to success. However, the point does not generalize to all state spaces set up by neural networks being seen as high dimensional maps that preserve distance/similarity relations in the world. The burden of the discussion section has been to show that we can have high levels of success (in face classification) with differing similarity or distance relations. When that happens, we can still talk of how reliably a system performs some task, but the notion of representational success (as Churchland defines it) does not play a role in defining that reliability.
In the case of the street map, there really is a kind of plausibility in saying that what explains the reliability of the map is that it preserves certain distance relations in the world. Two points need to be made about this. First, we need to understand that there is a difference between these two things: (a) being reliable and (b) explaining the source of that reliability. We have seen that we can understand what it is for a system (a face classifying neural network) to be reliable independent of understanding the source of that reliability. Churchland uses the notion of representational success (or preservation of distance relations) both to define reliability and to understand its source (i.e. to do both (a) and (b)). As we have seen, we can say that a system is reliable without having any information about the preservation of distance relations. Second, we need to be careful not to overstate the explanatory work the preservation of a set of distance relations does when there are many possible sets of such relations. If S1, S2, … Sn are all different sets of similarity relations that lead to equal levels of reliability in classifying faces, then it cannot be said that the network is successful because it persevered the similarity or distance relations in the world. The most that can be said in explaining the source of reliability is that the network is reliable because it captured or preserved one of S1 through Sn. We do not want to suggest that such a claim would be vacuous. It is not. However, it is not nearly as powerful or attractive as the case where there appears to be a single set of similarity relations in virtue of which reliability is achieved. The street map metaphor is suggestive of such a powerful case; there is no reason to expect that sort of case to capture what is going on in all cases of classificatory reliability in neural networks.
The street map example may be a special case. It turns out to be (optimally) reliable or something we can rely on if, and only if, a specific set of distance relations from the world are preserved by the map. We have not been given a reason for thinking that such will generally be the case when the high dimensional similarity spaces set up by neural networks are compared to the world. Churchland's position is at its strongest when dealing with cases like the street map. We take ourselves to have shown that such an example does not always generalize. The extent to which it might generalize is a question for future work.
